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The standard theoretical solution to the observation of substantial turnout in large elections is that
individuals receive utility from the act of voting.  However, this leaves open the question of whether
or not there is a significant margin on which individuals consider the effect of their vote on the outcome
in deciding whether or not to vote. 
In order to address this issue, I study turnout in union representation elections in the U.S.  (government
supervised secret ballot elections, generally held at the workplace, on the question of whether the workers
would like to be represented by a union).  These elections provide a particularly good laboratory to
study voter behavior because many of the elections have sufficiently few eligible voters that individuals
can have a substantial probability of being pivotal.  I develop a rational choice model of turnout in
these elections, and I implement this model empirically using data on over 75,000 of these elections
held from 1972-2009. 
The results suggest that most individuals (over 80 percent) vote in these elections independent of
consideration of the likelihood that they will be pivotal.  Among the remainder, the probability of voting
is related to variables that influence the probability of a vote being pivotal (election size and expected







farber@princeton.edu1 Introduction and Background
The economist's equivalent of a Molotov Cocktail in a \mixed" social gathering is to claim
that no rational individual should vote in large elections since the chances that this vote
will be pivotal in such elections is de minimis. Of course, the fact that so many of us
vote presents an interesting puzzle to economists and political scientists, whose solution
generally is to assume that individuals derive utility directly from the act of voting. In this
study, I investigate the extent to which voters in union representation elections consider the
probability that their vote would be pivotal in deciding whether or not to vote.
1.1 A Brief Review of the Literature
The rational choice theory of voting has a long history, dating at least to Downs (1957) who
recognized that, where voting is costly, individuals will consider both how much they care
about the outcome and the likelihood that their vote will inuence the outcome (be pivotal).
In large elections, the likelihood that an individual's vote will be pivotal is so small as to
make it unlikely that the expected benet of voting will outweigh the costs. This, of course,
leads to the diculty that if elections are large, no one will have the incentive to vote, but,
if no one votes, any one vote can determine the outcome so that the incentive to vote will
be high.
Without developing it fully, Downs suggested a solution based on the idea that there
important private and social benets to the act of voting that might accrue to individuals
and give them the incentive to vote. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) extend Downs's idea in a
useful model of the decision to vote that starts with the rational assumption that individuals
will vote if their expected utility from voting is higher than their expected utility from not
voting. They specify the dierence in expected utilities as R = (B  P)   C + D, where
 B is the utility gain from getting the preferred outcome,
 P is the probability that the individual's vote will yield the preferred outcome (the
probability that the individual is pivotal),
 C is the (non-negative) cost of voting, and
 D is the positive benet of the act of voting.
1An individual will vote if R > 0. The innovation is the introduction of D, which Riker
and Ordeshook attribute to a number of factors having to do with appropriate social and
political behavior as well as with personal psychological factors. The key here is that these
benets accrue regardless of whether the individual's vote is pivotal so that D, unlike B, is
not \diluted" by the usual low value for P in large elections.
Frerejohn and Fiorina (1974) present an alternative framework for understanding the vot-
ing decision based not on expected utility maximization but on the minimax regret decision
criterion. Rather than probability weight outcomes, as in expected utility maximization, the
minimax regret criterion has the individual calculate the dierence between the utility from
voting and the utility from not voting (regret for not voting) for each combination of election
outcome and whether or not the individual would have been pivotal. The individual then
chooses the option that yields the smallest value for regret. This decision process results in
much higher turnout rates in larger elections than does the expected utility maximization
model without a direct benet to voting.1
Further renement of the models and the introduction of game theoretic considerations,
where decisions to vote depend on the decisions of others, has occurred. Early models are
due to Ledyard (1981) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), and they demonstrate that
there can be substantial turnout even with large electorates. Levine and Palfrey (2007)
present a laboratory study of voter turnout that tests some of the implications of the Palfrey
and Rosenthal model.
My analysis is clearly in the spirit of the expected utility maximization approach with
the possibility of direct utility from the act of voting. The predictions of this model that I
examine with the data on union representation elections are similar to those used in the earlier
literature. I investigate the extent to which turnout varies inversely with size of election and
directly with the expected closeness of the outcome, both of which are systematically related
to the likelihood that a vote will be pivotal. I also examine a potential alternative explanation
for an inverse relationship between election turnout and size that, in an election where the
act of voting is directly observable by others, there may be social pressure in smaller elections
that enforces a norm of voting.2
1 This work generated substantial critical response. See Strom (1975), Stephens (1975), Mayer and Good
(1975), Beck (1975). Frerejohn and Fiorina (1975) respond.
2 Note that this is distinct from any direct benet from the act of voting that derives of an underlying
21.2 Background on Union Representation Elections
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), passed in 1935, codied in law the right of
workers in the private sector to be represented by a union of their choice.3 This law specied
a secret ballot election mechanism that allowed workers to express their preferences for union
rpresentation. In broad strokes, a union (or potential union) can petition the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) to hold an election by a \showing of interest" by workers in the
potential bargaining unit. An employer can also request an election if a question arises
about workers' preferences for union representation. After issues involving the denition of
the appropriate group of workers involved are resolved, the NLRB holds an election.4 If
the union receives more than 50 percent of the votes cast in the election, then the NLRB
certies that the union is the exclusive representative of the workers for the purposes of
collective bargaining.5 This certication is valid for one year. If the union and employer reach
agreement on a congtract within that period, then the union continues as the bargaining
agent of the workers. If the union and employer do not reach agreement within that period,
then the union is no longer recognized as the bargaining agent of the workers.6
Union representation elections, the vast majority of which are held in the workplace, are
an excellent laboratory to examine whether there is, in fact, an important margin on which
norm or belief that does not rely on observability.
3 Additional legislation that served to modify the NLRA includes 1) the Labor-Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, passed in 1947 over President Truman's veto and 2) the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure (Landrum-Grin) Act, passed in 1959.
4 There are many rules governing employer and union behavior during organizing campaigns, and either
side may le \unfair labor practice" charges against the other side with the NLRB. The NLRB adjudicates
these charges either before or after the election.
5 The fact that the union needs more than 50 percent implies that unions lose ties. Given the large
number of small elections where ties can happen with non-trivial probability, this has implications for the
analysis I present below.
6 While not directly related to this study, it has been argued that the election process is too cumbersome
and that employers can manipulate the process through coercive means that 1) make it dicult for unions
to win these elections (e.g., Weiler, 1983; Freeman, 1985) and, 2) where they win elections, to fail to reach
agreement on a rst contract (Prosten, 1978). One result of this is a proposed revision to the NLRA, the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) that provides for 1) recognition of a union as the bargaining agent of the
workers on the basis of a \card check" and 2) rst-contract arbitration, whereby an arbitrator sets the terms
of the rst contract in the event that the union and the employer do not reach agreement. The EFCA is now
pending before Congress and many expect some version of this law to be enacted (though perhaps without
some of the relevant provisions). See Johnson (2002) for an analysis of the Canadian experience with card
check recognition that implies a substantial advantage to unions.
3individuals use the rational voter calculus to decide whether to vote. In at least two ways,
these elections are an ideal setting to study voter turnout.
1. There are data on a very large number of elections, each of which is a referendum
on a single issue: should workers be represented by a labor union for the purpose
of collective bargaining. My analysis sample contains data on over 75,000 elections
between 1972 and 2009.
2. A substantial fraction of these elections have a small number of eligible voters; 38
percent have 10 or fewer, 62 percent have 20 or fewer, and 74 percent have 30 or fewer
eligible voters.
Thus, there are many elections where a potential voter has a reasonable probability of being
pivotal and where the rational voter decision calculus might be important.
A complicating factor is that, unlike political elections, the fact that an organizing drive
resulting in an election is held is the result of a decision made by either a labor union (most
commonly) or by an independent group of employees.7 A union's decision about whether
to ask for an election is based, in part, on the likelihood of winning the election. Since the
likelihood of a union victory is aected by voter turnout, the selection process yielding an
election needs to be explicitly considered.
In the next section, I introduce and discuss the data on election outcomes. I also present
a set of facts regarding the level of election activity, union success in elections, and voter
turnout that should be explained by a model of voter behavior. In section 3, I present
the theoretical framework, including both a model of the union decision to undertake a
representation election as well as a model of an individual worker's voting decision. Taken
together, these models yield testable implications that allow me to 1) account for the broad
set of facts presented as well as 2) shed light on the extent to which voting in these elections
is sensitive to factors related to the likelihood that a vote will be pivotal and the extent
to which individuals vote due to some direct benet from the act of voting. In section 4, I
present a statistical description of turnout rates, and, in section 5, I implement the model
7 An election can be requested formally by a labor union (95 percent of elections) after a showing of
substantial interest through the signing of authorization cards by at least 30 percent of workers in the
potential bargaining unit.
4empirically. In section 6, I discuss issues related to the interpretation and evaluation of the
model, and section 7 concludes.
2 Data and High-Level Facts
I have data on 237,022 individual elections involving a single union \closed" by the NLRB
between July 1962 and August 2009.8 Of these, 213,548 elections are \certication" elections
to determine if a union should represent a group of currently non-unionized workers. The
remaining 23,474 elections are \decertication" elections to determine if an existing union
should continue to represent a group of currently unionized workers.9
2.1 The Level of Election Activity
In order to set the stage for the theoretical and empirical analyses, I present some aggregate
facts regarding the level of election activity over time, union success in elections, and voter
turnout.
As shown in Figure 1, the number of certication elections fell sharply in the early 1980s,
dropping from about 7,000 per year earlier to less than 2,000 per year later.10 Interestingly,
at the same time the average size of elections held increased gradually from about 55 workers
per election to about 70 workers per election. As I will demonstrate in the next section, this
time-series pattern is consistent with unions making optimizing decisions about whether to
request an election in an organizing environment that deteriorated in the early 1980s and
where unions realize increasing returns to oranization with unit size.
8 These are administrative data for federal scal years 1963-2009. Early in the period the federal scal
year ran from July to June before switching to October to September. I recode the earlier scal year to run
from October to September. On this basis, I have complete data on elections closed during the 1963-2009
scal years (other than those closed in September 2009) as well as during the last quarter of the 1962 scal
year. I have compiled these data over a long period using data received from the NLRB. I thank Alexandre
Mas for compiling the data from 1962 through 1972.
9 In this case, the union is decertied only if a majority of the voters vote to decertify. Thus, the union
wins ties in decertication elections.
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Figure 1: Number of Elections and Average Size of Elections, 5-year moving average
2.2 Union Success in Elections
The union win rate in elections held (gure 2) fell from over 55 percent in the mid-1960s
to less than 45 percent in the early 1980s, then increased to 60 percent by 2005. The
fraction of votes cast that were cast in favor of union representation follows a similar pattern
with changes of smaller amplitude. As I discuss below, the pattern since the early 1980s
is consistent with an optimizing union in a deteriorating organizing environment making
strategic decisions regarding contesting elections of dierent sizes.11
2.3 Voter Turnout
There are important data issues in studying voter turnout. In many elections (about one-
third) some ballots are challenged by the employer. The NLRB sets these ballots aside and
11 Farber (2001) estimates a model of union win rates and vote shares by election size that accounts for
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Figure 2: Union Win Rate and Pro-Union Vote Share, 5-year moving average
only investigates their validity if their aggregate number could have changed the election
outcome. If they could not change the outcome, they are ignored and their votes are not
recorded as pro- or anti-union. If they could change their outcome, at least some are in-
vestigated (to the point where the outcome is no longer at issue). The number reported
as eligible to vote is the ex ante number, including any workers whose eligibility is later
questioned. Thus, a turnout rate calculated as the ratio of the sum of the pro and con votes
to the number reported as eligible will not be accurate in the presence of challeges unless all
are resolved and the numbers adjusted accordingly.
I proceed by examining turnout only in elections where there are no challenged ballots.
While this is likely not a random subset of all elections, it eliminates the important measure-
ment issues. Unfortunately, there are no data on the number of challenged ballots in elections
closed before July 1972 or in elections closed between December 1978 and September 1980.
Of the 132,869 elections with information on challenged ballots, 79,878 (60.1 percent) had
no challenges and can be used for the analysis of turnout.
7Another issue is that a small fraction of elections were carried out by mail ballot or with
a combination of on-site and mail balloting (mixed elections) rather than on-site. NLRB
procedures regarding representation cases state that mail balloting is used only in unusual
circumstances at the discretion of the NLRB Regional Director.12 While there is no infor-
mation on the mode of election prior to scal year 1984, fewer than 1 percent of elections
between 1984 and 1990 were mail or mixed elections. On this basis, I proceed assuming that
all elections prior to scal 1984 were carried out on-site.
From 1984 onward, 94 percent of elections were on-site, 4.8 percent were by mail ballot,
0.2 percent were mixed, and the mode is missing for 1 percent.13 However, the fraction of
elections with mail ballots increased to about 13 percent by 2002 before declining to about
10 percent by 2009. Figure 3 contains a plot of the distribution of election by mode.14 I
have no explanation for the increase in use of mail ballots in the last two decades.
I proceed with the analysis using the 77,308 on-site elections wtih no challenges 1972-
2009. I return to the mail ballots later when examining the role of social pressure in voter
turnout.
The broad facts regarding mean turnout based on these data are presented in gure 4.
The average turnout rate across on-site elections held steady at about 92 percent until the
mid-1990s and has since fallen to about 84 percent. Figure 4 also contains the time series
of the aggregate turnout rate (the ratio of the total number of votes across all elections to
the total number of eligible voters across all elections). The aggregate turnout rate shows a
similar time-series pattern though it falls much more sharply, from 92 percent to 76 percent.
The sharper decline of the aggregate turnout rate could reect a shift in composition of
12 The NLRB document, An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representations Cases, ch. 22, states that
\Mail balloting is used, if at all, in unusual circumstances, particularly where eligible voters are scattered
either because of their duties or their work schedules or in situations where there is a strike, picketing, or
lockout in progress. In these situations the Regional Director considers mail balloting taking into consid-
eration the desires of the parties, the ability of voters to understand mail ballots, and the ecient use of
Board personnel." NLRB procedures also allow for limited mixed elections, with ballots for those eligible
voters who cannot vote in person. This does not include absentees or those who are on vacation. See
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/manuals/r - case outline.aspx. Accessed on September 25, 2009.
13 Not surprisingly, given the fact that mail balloting is used at the discretion of the regional director is
that there is substantial variation across the 37 NLRB regions in usage rate of mail balloting. Between 1984
and 2009 the usage rate of mail balloting ranged from less than one percent in Newark and Houston to more
than 10 percent in Milwaukee, Peoria, and Seattle.
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Figure 4: Turnout rate in On-Site Union Represenation Elections
9elections (for example from smaller to larger elections with lower turnout).
One test of the relevance of a rational voter model of turnout is the extent to which the
decline evident in gure 4 can be accounted for by the likelihood that a voter will be pivotal.
I present this test below.
Turnout rates in union representation elections are very high compared to those we see
in the usual political elections. This could reect several factors. First, these elections
are relatively small, averaging 50 to 75 eligible voters (gure 1), so that a worker's vote
has a reasonable probability of being pivotal. Second, these elections are about workers'
livelihoods, so the stakes can be very high. Third, these elections are generally held at the
workplace during working hours, so the cost of voting is relatively low.
3 Theoretical Framework
There are three relevant groups of actors in determining the outcomes of representation
elections.
 Labor unions who decide which groups of workers to attempt to organize through the
election process,
 Employees in workplaces who can vote if an election is held, and
 Employers of non-union workers who can aect both the likelihood of an election being
held and the outcome of elections that are held through their treatment of workers and
actions during an organizing drive.
In what follows, I do not consider employer behavior directly but understand that unions
and workers make decisions considering employer actions.
3.1 The Union's Decision to Hold a Representation Election
I begin with modeling the union's decision to hold a representation election. The set of
elections that are held is the result of a selection process by labor unions about where to
focus their organizing activity. An economically rational labor union will contest elections
only where there is a positive expected value associated with the election. This suggests
that among all possible potential bargaining units, called \targets" here, elections are more
10likely when the likelihood of a union victory is higher. This has some important implications
for the analysis of both the quantity of election activity and election outcomes over time.
First, the potential bargaining units in which elections are held at any point in time are not
representative of the pool of targets since elections are more likely to be held in places where
workers are thought to be favorable to unions. Second, unions may perceive larger benet
to organization in certain types of workplaces, and, in these cases, they will be willing to
contest an election even where workers may be less favorably disposed to unions.
Consider a union's decision regarding whether or not to contest an election in a specic
target. The union bases its decision on several factors:15
 the per-worker benet to the union of a union victory (V ),
 the per-worker cost to the union (net of union dues) of negotiating a contract and
administering a unionized workplace (Ca),
 the per-worker cost to the union of the organization eort (Co), and
 the probability of a union victory in an election ().
The denition of the benets and costs as per-worker organized (the number of eligible
workers, N) is simply a normalization that eases exposition.
Dene the per-worker expected value to the union of contesting an election at target i as
Vi = i(Vi   Cai)   Coi: (1)
A rational union will undertake to organize the target if Vi is positive. This implies that the













and unions will contest elections where i > 
i.
15 I abstract here from the fact that a union victory in many cases does not result in the successful
negotiation of a contract. This diculty in negotiating a rst contract has increased over time. While there
are no systematic data on representative samples of union-won elections, Weiler (1984) analyzed a small
number of surveys and found that the fraction of union wins yielding rst contracts fell from 86 percent in
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Figure 5: Union Win Rate and Pro-Union Vote Share, by Election Size (5-voter moving
average)
An important characteristic of the target is its size (Ni). Size has a direct eect on the
probability of a union victory. The number of workers could also have an important eect
on the appeal of the target to the union even holding the probability of a union victory
xed. A union victory in a large election could have important positive spillovers for the
union in terms of bargaining leverage and \marketing" value in other organizing campaigns
(
@Vi
@Ni > 0). Additionally, there may be decreasing costs per worker of holding the organizing
drive (
@Coi
@Ni < 0) and/or decreasing costs per member of servicing a bargaining unit once there
is a union victory (
@Cai
@Ni < 0). Together, these imply that the critical value for the probability
of a union victory is decreasing in election size (
@
i
@Ni < 0) so that unions will contest larger
elections where they have a smaller chance of winning. This selection by unions implies that
observed union win rates will be negatively related to the number of eligible voters.
This prediction is supported by evidence on union win rates in elections of various sizes.
Figure 5 contains plots of the union win rate and pro-union vote share rate in elections by
12number of eligible voters. Consistent with the union selection model, union win rates and
pro-union vote shares fall with election size.
Substantial evidence exists that the political and legal environment for unions worsened
substantially in the early 1980's (Weiler (1990), Gould (1993), and Levy (1985)). This could
aect both the distribution of  and the cost of organization to the union (Co). A shift to the
left in the distribution of  (implying fewer good targets for organization) does not, by itself,
imply a change in the critical value for the probability of a union victory (). The rst-
order result will be that fewer elections will be held. But, since the selection rule remains
unchanged, union success in elections that are held will not be greatly aected.16 However,
if the adverse changes in the organizing environment increase the cost of organization (Co),
the result will be an increase in  implying that the set of elections actually contested
will become more favorable to unions. Taken together, the eects of adverse changes in
the organizing environment on the distribution of  and on Co will result in fewer elections
held but greater union success in those elections that are held. This is consistent with the
evidence presented in gures 1 and 2.
The key lesson to take away from this model is that any analysis of voting behavior and
election outcomes must take into account the union selection process regarding where to
contest elections.
3.2 Voting Decisions of Workers and Election Outcomes
In a rational voter model, the decision to vote is based on a comparison of expected utility
conditional on voting (E(UjV )) with expected utility conditional on not voting (E(UjNV )).
Expected values are used since the outcome of the election is uncertain.
Consider the following framework, which borrows heavily from the analysis of Coate,
Conlin, and Moro (2008). In a given workplace, the expected fraction of workers who are
pro-union is denoted by . These workers, if they vote, vote in favor of union representation.
Similarly, anti-union workers, if they vote, vote against union representation. Pro-union
workers receive a benet of bp > 0 if the union wins the election. Anti-union workers receive
a \benet" of bc < 0 if the union wins the election. For simplicity, I assume bp =  bc = b in
16 In fact, the extent to which union success will be aected depends on the underlying distribution of 
before and after the shift.
13what follows.
I dene Ci as the cost of voting to worker i net of the direct benet worker i receives from
the act of voting itself, independent of any expected benet that comes from the possibility
that his vote would alter the election outcome. As such, Ci may well be negative.17 I assume
Ci varies across workers and is distributed with CDF G().
Consider rst a pro-union worker i. The change in his expected utility if he votes is the
probability that his vote is pivotal times b less the cost of voting (Ci). The NLRA species
that the union is certied as the bargaining agent of the workers if and only if a majority of
those voting vote in favor. Thus, unions lose ties. On this basis, a pro-union worker's vote
will be pivotal only if the election would be tied without his vote. Denote the probability
that the vote would be tied without his vote by W+. On this basis, a pro-union worker
will vote if
Ci  bW+: (4)
Given the assumed distribution for costs and noting that  represents the probability that a
randomly selected worker is pro-union, the probability that a worker votes in favor of union
representation is
pp = G(bW+): (5)
The voting decision of an anti-union worker is analogous. The change is his expected
utility if he votes is the probability that his vote is pivotal times b less the cost of voting (Ci).
Given the fact that unions lose ties, an anti-union worker's vote will be pivotal only if the
union would win with a plurality of a single vote without his vote. Denote the probability
of a union win by a single vote if without his vote by W . On this basis, an anti-union
worker will vote if
Ci  bW : (6)
Given the assumed distribution for costs, the probability that a worker votes against union
representation is
pc = (1   )G(bW ): (7)
The turnout rate in the election is
pv = pp + pc = G(bW+) + (1   )G(bW ): (8)
17 In the notation of Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Ci (the net cost of voting) is C + D (the sum of the
cost of voting (C) and the direct benet of voting (D).
14The probability that a worker does not vote (the abstention rate) is
pa = 1   pv = 1   G(bW+)   (1   )G(bW ): (9)
Assuming that individuals' decisions to vote are independent in a given election, the num-












where N = np + nc + na is the total number of eligible voters. Given the multinomial
distribution for the vote counts dened in equation 10 and the fact that unions win an
election when more than half the votes cast are cast in favor of union represenation, the







3.2.1 Pivotal Pro-Union Workers
The probability that a pro-union worker's vote is pivotal (the probablity of a tie not including
the vote of worker i), based on the multinomial distribution for the vote counts, is












where n = N   1, the number of eligible voters less one and INT() returns the truncated
integer value of its argument. This rather complicated expression has several key properties:
1. The probability that a pro-union worker's vote is pivotal tends to fall with the number
of eligible voters. This underlies the usual result that the probability that a voter is
pivotal falls with election size.
2. Holding election size xed, W+ varies directly with the gap between Pp and Pc. The
probability of a tie is maximized when Pp = Pc.
3. The marginal eect of a change in the gap between Pp and Pc on W+ falls with
election size. This is a direct result of the fact that a for a given dierence in vote
probabilites, a single vote will be more likely to be pivotal in a smaller election.
154. W+ tends to be larger when the total number of eligible voters is odd than when
it is even. This is particularly true when the probability of abstention is low and the
number of eligible voters is small. The intuition for this result becomes clearer when
considering the case where all workers vote (pa = 0). In this case, the probability of a
tie among all voters but one is uniquely zero when N is even. The n = N   1 votes,
an odd number, cannot be split equally. However, the probability of a tie among the
n = N   1 voters is positive for odd values of N and decreasing with N.
3.2.2 Pivotal Anti-Union Workers
A similar analysis follows for anti-union workers. The probability that an anti-union worker's
vote is pivotal is the probablity that the union wins by one not including the vote of worker
i. Based on the multinomial distribution for the vote counts, this is












With some modication, this expression has key properties similar to W+.
1. As with the probability of a tie, the probability that an anti-union worker's vote is
pivotal tends to fall with the number of eligible voters. This further supports the usual
result that the probability that a voter is pivotal falls with election size.
2. Holding election size xed, W , the probability of a union plurality of one vote
is maximized when Pp is slightly greater than Pc, with the optimal gap falling with
election size. In this case it is (approximately) true that W  varies directly with the
gap between Pp and Pc.
3. As before, the marginal eect of a change in the gap between Pp and Pc on W  falls
with election size.
4. W  tends to be larger when the total number of eligible voters is even than when
it is odd. This eect is stronger when the probability of not voting (pa) is small and
the number of eligible voters is small. In the case where all workers vote (pa = 0), the
probability of a union victory by a single vote is uniquely zero when N is odd. The
n = N   1 votes, an even number, cannot be split to yield a plurality of a single vote.
16However, the probability of a single-vote union victory among the n = N  1 voters is
positive for even values of N and decreasing with N.
3.2.3 Empirical Predictions
The central analytic diculty is that the probabilities of being pivotal depend on the de-
cisions of all voters. As such, an equilibrium concept is needed to dene the outcome. A
natural assumption is a symmetric Nash equilibrium such that all voters are making deci-
sions regarding whether to vote consistent with equations 4 or 6, as appropriate, conditional
on common information regarding fraction pro-union () and the distribution of costs (G(),
and benet of getting the preferred outcome (b). However, it is not possible to derive closed
form solutions for pp and pc because the expressions for the proabilities of being pivotal are
complicated and depend on pp and pc.
However, as described above there are important empirical predictions of the model.
These include
1. Turnout will fall as the cost of voting increases.
2. Turnout will fall with election size.
3. The pro-union vote share will be larger in elections with an odd number of eligble
voters than in an election with an even number of eligible voters. Restated, the anti-
union vote share will be larger in elections with an even number of eligible voters than
in an election with an odd number of eligible voters.
4. Holding election size xed, turnout will increase with the expected closeness of ex ante
preferences for and against union representation.
5. The marginal eect on turnout of an increase in expected closeness of preferences will
fall with election size.
3.3 An Alternative Explanation: Social Pressure
One reason why individuals may vote even when their probability of being pivotal is very
small is that a norm exists where-by \good citizens" vote.18 It may or may not be the case
18 See, for example, Knack, 1992.
17that the observability of the act of voting is an important component in enforcing a voting
norm. In the context of union representation elections, if observability is important, then
turnout would be higher in on-site elections, observability voting is straightforward and likely
more eective than in mail elections, where observability is dicult, if not impossible. This
higher social pressure to vote in on-site elections as a negative cost of voting and implies
that turnout will be lower in mail elections than in on-site elections.
Another prediction of the social pressure model is that, because observability is likely
more dicult in larger on-site elections than in smaller on-site elections, the resulting diminu-
tion of social pressure in larger elections could account for a negative relationship between
turnout and election size. Funk (2008) presents evidence consistent with this idea. She
analyzes turnout in Swiss elections, where an option to vote by mail was introduced in order
to encourage voting. The idea is that voting by mail in general elections reduces the cost
of voting by eliminating the need to travel to the polling place.19 However, voting by mail,
even in general elections, may also reduce social pressure by reducing observability as indi-
viduals can claim they voted by mail. Funk nds that there was very little eect on overall
turnout in the Swiss \natural experiment," suggesting that the cost reduction of voting by
mail was largely oset by the reduction in social pressure. She conrms this with a nding
that turnout was more negatively aected in smaller communities, where presumably there
is more social pressure due to easier observability by the community at large.
This suggests a test of the competing models predicting an inverse relationship between
turnout and election size. The economic model predicts that turnout will fall with election
size regardless of the mode of the election. The social-pressure model predicts that turnout
will fall with election size only in on-site elections (as individual votes are less obvious to the
whole community). Evidence that the marginal eect of election size on turnout is smaller
in mail elections than in on-site elections would imply that social pressure is important. I
implement this test in my empirical analysis.
19 This is in contrast to the NLRB representation elections analyzed here because the on-site elections are
held at the work-place, so that no special trip is required.
184 A Statistical Description of Turnout Rates
The simplest statistical model of the turnout rate is a binomial model that is derived from the
multinomial model of the pro-union, anti-union, abstain vote decision specied in equation
10. In this model the probability that a worker in election j votes is pj and the probability
that a worker in election j does not vote is 1   pj. The number of votes cast in election j






j (1   pj)
N Vj: (14)
Given that voting probabilities vary across elections and in order to restrict the probability
to the unit interval, I specify pj as a linear function of a vector of variables, Xj so that
pj = Xj, and this is also the expected turnout rate.
While a model such as this may t mean turnout rates quite well, it does not tell the
whole story. If there is unmeasured heterogeneity across elections (heterogeneity that is not
captured by the variables in X), then this model will underpredict dispersion across elections
in turnout rates. This is an example of the well-known problem of over-dispersion in count
models.
Consider the following simple descriptive statistical model. Suppose that I model the
vote probability in election j as an unconstrained function of the number of eligible voters.
In this case the maximum likelihood estimate of pj is the overall ratio across all elections
of a given size of the number of votes cast to the total number of eligible voters. This is
equivalent to specifying pj to be a function of a complete set of xed eects for the number
of eligible voters. This model will t average turnout in elections of a given size perfectly,
but it has trouble with higher moments. For example, the probability of full turnout is
Pr(Tj = 1) = p
j
j; (15)
and this is strongly underpredicted by the simple binomial model
A simple illustration that this is so is presented in Figure 6, which contains a plot of both
the observed probability of full turnout in on-site elections and the predicted probability
based on the average turnout rate in on-site elections of a particular size.20 The predicted
20 This illustration is restricted to on-site elections, which make up 97.4 percent of all elections, for clarity.











0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Number of Eligible Voters






























Figure 6: Probability of Full Turnout, by Total Number of Eligible Voters. The predicted
fraction =  p
j
j and is based on the binomial distribution.
probability of full turnout in an election with j eligible voters is  p
j
j, where  pj represents the
observed turnout rate in on-site elections with j eligible voters.21 It is clear that this simple
model substantially underpredicts the likelihood of full turnout. Given observed average
turnout rates, the predicted probability of full turnout is virtually zero in elections with 50
or more eligible voters. However, a substantial fraction of these elections (11.3 percent) have
full turnout.
The underlying source of this over-dispersion is variation across elections of a given size
in the probability of a worker voting. One approach to solving this problem is to assume
a particular distribution for the probability of a worker voting in a particular election. A
commonly-used distribution for this purpose is the beta distribution. This distribution has
positive density only on the unit interval, and it has the additional advantage of yielding a
21 Due to the relative scarcity of larger elections, the actual fraction of elections with full turnout presented
as a moving average (-5,+5) for elections with 50 or more eligible voters.
20tractable result when mixed with the binomial distribution. On this basis, I assume that p













By the Bayes theorem, the distribution of p conditional on observing v votes cast among





Assuming a binomial distribution for votes in a given election, the probability of observing









Given that p has a beta distribution, the unconditional distribution of the number of votes






 (a + b) (a + v) (b + N   v)
 (a) (b) (N + a + b)
: (20)
It is convenient to reparameterize the beta distribution in terms of m = a
(a+b) and  = a+
b. The expected value of p is m, and the variance of p is 2 =
m(1 m)
(1+) . This parameterization













 () (m + v) ((1   m) + N   v)
 (m) ((1   m)) (N + )
: (22)
Overdispersion is captured by the parameter . As  ! 1, the variance of p goes to zero..
Smaller values of  imply positive variance in the expected fraction voting across elections.
22 The beta distribution has a exible functional form. The distribution is unimodal (inverse U-shaped) if
m > 1 and (1   m) > 1. Otherwise, the distribution is bimodal (U- or J- shaped). A special case is that
the distribution is uniform if  = 2 and m = 0:5.
21Table 1: Binomial and Beta-Binomial Model Model of Voter Turnout
Variable Binomial Beta-Binomial







Year FE's Yes Yes
 ---- 6.756
0.064
Log L -210379.7 -126336.9
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood over the sample of
75,300 on-site elections (with a total of 2,014,616 elgibile voters) with
no challenged ballots, between 2 and 200 eligible voters and at least 2
votes cast. The base scal year is 2000. Asymptotic standard errors
are in parentheses.
In order to evaluate this model, I start by estimating a binomial model of the turnout
rate at the election level where the probability of that an individual votes (pj) is a linear
function of the inverse square root of the number of eligible voters.23 I estimate this model
using the sample of 75,300 on-site elections with 2-200 eligible voters and at least two votes
cast. The estimates of this model are contained in the rst column of table 1, and they verify
that, as expected, turnout falls with election size.
The second column of table 1 contains estimates of the beta-binomial model. This model
adds a single parameter () that controls the degree of dispersion in the vote probability.
Note that there is virtually no dierence in the estimates of the coecients of the mean
probability of voting function between the beta and beta-binomial models. However, the
estimate of  in the beta-binomial model as well as the substantial improvement in the log-
likelihood function between the binomial and the beta-binomial models implies that there is
signicant variation in the voting probability across elections of a given size.
While I do not present the results here, I have also estimated the model including ad-
ditional controls for 38 NLRB regions, 9 broad occupational groups, and 9 broad industry
23 The inverse square root function is a parsimonious specication that does a good job tting the change
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Figure 7: Beta Density Function of Vote Probability (Based on m = 0:9,  = 6:756).
groups.24 Adding these controls has no substantive eect on the coecient of interest (the
coecient of 1=
p
N. The estimate of  increases to 7.51, consistent with the idea that there
is less unobserved heterogeneity across election sites once variation in region, industry, and
occupation are accounted for directly.
Figure 7 contains a plot of the estimated density function for p assuming a mean turnout
rate of m = 0:9 and  = 6:756 in scal year 2000, as estimated. The value for m of 0.9
corresponds to an election with 15 eligible voters in scal year 2000 based on the beta-
binomial estimates, and implied median turnout rate is 0.934. The gure illustrates that
there are many elections with very high expected vote probabilities. The standard deviation
of this distribution is 0.108, and the 75th and 90th percentiles of this distribution are 0.978
and 0.993 respectively.
24 The industry coding changed in FY2000, and it was not possible to construct a reliable crosswalk
between the two coding systems. As a result, I include separate sets of industry controls for the pre-2000
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Figure 8: Probability Full Turnout, by Total Number of Eligible Voters. (Predicted fractions
from binomial and beta-binomial mdoels in table 1.)
Can the variation across elections in the vote probability account for the high observed
probability of full turnout relative to the binomial model? In order to investigate this
question, I calculated the predicted full turnout probabilities from both the binomial and
beta-binomial models described above. Figure 8 contains plots of the predicted full-turnout
rates from the two models along with the observed full-turnout fractions by number of eligible
voters. As shown in gure 6, the binomial model seriously under-predicts the likelihood of
full turnout. The beta-binomial model, which allows for a distribution of vote probabilities
across elections tracks the observed probability of full turnout much more closely. This is
because, while both models estimate the mean turnout rate accurately, the mean turnout
by number eligible is too low in elections with more than a few voters to generate enough
elections with full turnout. The estimated beta distribution, as shown in gure 7, implies
that there are substantial numbers of elections with very high turnout probablities (well
above the estimated mean), and these are relatively likely to result in full turnout.
24Based on these results, I continue my investigation of the determinants of voter turnout
using the beta-binomial model.
5 Empirical Results
The model developed in the previous section has a number of clear predictions regarding
turnout and election outcomes. I analyze these in turn:
1. The relationship of turnout with election size.
2. The relationship between turnout and whether the election has an odd or even number
of eligible voters.
3. The relationship of turnout with the expected closeness of an election.
4. The second-order relationship of election size with the marginal eect of closeness on
turnout.
5.1 Turnout and Election Size
The probability that a worker's vote will be pivotal is inversely related to the size of the
election. The tted values for the mean turnout rate in on-site elections based on the beta-
binomial model presented in the second column of Table 1 are plotted in gure 9 along with
a ve-voter moving average of the observed turnout rate in elections with more than 30
eligible voters.25 These plots show a decline in both observed and predicted turnout from
about 95 percent in the smallest elections to less than 89 percent in elections with 100 voters
or more.
The convexity of the relationship of the turnout rate with election size is clear from this
plot. The predicted decline in the turnout rate from an increase in election size from 10 to
20 eligible voters is 1.0 percentage point. The predicted decline in the turnout rate from an
increase in election size from 100 to 110 eligible voters is 0.05 percentage points (or about
one-twentieth the size).
25 I use the moving average because the relatively small number of large elections with particular numbers
of eligible voters leads to substantial variation in average turnout. The predicted turnout rate is not a
smooth function of the number eligible because of the year xed eects in the model and changes in the size
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Figure 9: Turnout Rate by Number Eligible { 5-Voter Moving Average.
(Predicted based on ^ m, Table 1.)
The clear result is that turnout falls with election size as workers are less likely to be
pivotal. However, it is also clear that turnout remains very high even in relatively large
elections. This suggests that, while there is a margin of voters who may be considering the
likelihood that their vote will be pivotal, most voters appear to vote regardless of the likely
instrumentality of their vote.
5.2 Turnout and the Odd/Even Distinction
Given the fact that unions lose ties, the probability of being pivotal in small elections depends
importantly on whether the number of eligible voters is odd or even and whether a particular
voter is pro- or anti-union. A pro-union voter is pivotal when the election would be tied
without his/her vote. In that case, they would cast the deciding vote in favor of union
representation. Thus, pro-union voters are more likely to be pivotal in small elections with
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Figure 10: Fraction Voting Pro- and Anti-Union, by Number Eligible.
would win by a single vote without his/her vote. Thus, anti-union voters are more likely to
be pivotal in small elections with an even number of eligible voters.
While these dierences oset for the most part in determining overall turnout, these
considerations suggest that, other things equal, the fraction of eligible workers voting pro-
union will be higher in elections with an odd number eligible than in elections with an even
number eligible. Similarly, the fraction of eligible workers voting anti-union will be higher
in elections with an even number eligible than in elections with an odd number eligible.
Empirically, this prediction of the model nds no support in the data. Figure 10 contains
plots of the fraction of those eligible voting for and against union representation by the
number eligible. There is no evidence of either lower pro-union vote fractions or higher
anti-union vote fractions in elections with an even number of eligible workers.26
26 Simple t-tests of the dierence in average vote fractions between even and odd elections show no
signcant dierence for either the pro-union or anti-union fractions. The p-value is greater than 0.9 in both
cases. Estimation of models of the prounion vote share that control for election size also show no relationship
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Figure 11: Union Vote Share and Win Rate, by Number of Eligible Voters
Figure 11 contains a plot of the union win rate and pro-union vote share in small elections
by the number of eligible voters. There is clear evidence in elections with 10 or fewer voters
that the union win rate is smaller in elections with an even number of eligible voters although
there is not a systematic relationship of the \evenness" of the election with vote share. This
suggests that unions do not completely oset the unions-lose-ties bias in the NLRA when
selecting targets for organization. It may the case the union cannot predict precisely how
many workers will be eligible to vote on the future election date given uctuating employment
levels and uncertainty about eligibility. It may also be the case that workers do not know the
odd-even distinction or do not know whether their election has an even or and odd number
of eligible voters in making their voting decisions.
Based on these results, I proceed assuming, where necessary, that the expected turnout
rate in given elections does not dier between pro- and anti-union workers.
A nal observation is that the prounion vote fraction is decreasing and the anti-union
vote fraction is increasing in election size. This is consistent with the model of the union's
28organizing decision developed in section 3.1. In this model, the union will attempt an election
where the probability of a union victory () exceeds a critical value (). Let p represent
the probability that a worker will vote in favor of union representation. It is the case that,
for any p > 0:5, the probability of a union victory is increasing in election size. Thus, as
election size increases, smaller p's satisfy the condition that  > . The observed decline
in pro-union vote share with election size is also consistent with the hypothesis that unions
are more likely to contest larger elections where they have a smaller chance of winning (
is decreasing in election size).
5.3 Turnout and Election Closeness
Ignoring the odd-even distinction that dierentially aects pro- and anti-union workers, the
model predicts that a worker's vote is more likely to be pivotal when preferences are close to
evenly split between pro- and anti-union.27 An even split of preferences is represented in the
model developed in section 3.2 by  = 0:5. While  is not observed, I assume that elections
dier in their underlying fraction pro-union and that there is a known prior distribution
for . I develop a useful proxy for  based on the posterior distribution of  given the
observed pro-union vote share in that election. I calculate this distribution assuming that
the expected turnout rate is the same among pro-union and anti-union workers.
As I noted earlier, a commonly-used distribution for probabilities is the beta distribution.







where the expected value of  is  and the variance of  is 2 =
(1 )
(+1) .
By the Bayes theorem, the distribution of  conditional on observing s pro-union votes





Assuming a binomial distribution for votes in a given election, the probability of observing
27 I say \close to evenly split" rather than \evenly split" because pro-union voters are more likely to be
pivotal when the expected vote is evenly split without their vote. In this case, the overall expected fraction
pro-union is somewhat greater than 0.5, with the dierence from 0.5 declining with election size.









Given that  has a beta distribution, the unconditional distribution of the number of






 () ( + s) ((1   ) + n   s)
 () ((1   )) (n + )
: (26)
Given these relationships and equation 24, the posterior distribution of  given s positive
votes among n voters is
f(js) =
 (n + )




where s = s + . The posterior mean of  given s is
E(js) =
 (n + )









0 s(1 )n s+ 1d is the Beta function with parameters s+1 and n+ s,














Thus, the posterior mean of the pro-union share in the workplace given the pro-union share
of votes in the election is a weighted average of the observed vote share and the prior mean.28
The weight depends on the election size (n) and the parameter  that controls the variance
of the Beta distribution for . As the election size increases, the weight shifts from the prior
mean () to the observed pro-union vote share (s=n). As the prior variance of  decreases
( increases), the weight shifts to the prior mean.
The index I use to measure the (inverse) ex ante closeness of an election is the expectation
of the squared dierence between pro-union vote preference given the observed vote share
and 0.5. After some algebra, this is
E((   0:5)
2js) = 0:25  

n + 
n +  + 1

E(js)(1   E(js)); (30)
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Figure 12: Year Eects on Estimated Mean Pro-Union Share
where E(js) is dened in equation 29.
Calculation of the closeness index for each election requires data on the total number of
votes cast and the number of prounion votes cast in each election along with estimates of the
parameters ( and ) of the Beta distribution of the fraction prounion (). The probability
of s pro-union votes of n votes cast is dened in equation 25, and I use this probability
statement to derive the likelihood function for the vote counts in the elections in my sample.
I specify the mean of the distribution of the prounion vote share to be a linear function
of the inverse square root of the number eligible and a set of scal year xed eects. The is
it = 0 + 1  (1=
p
Nit) + t; (31)
for election i in year t. I expect that the fraction pro-union will be negatively related to
election size due to the union selection process outlined above. I estimated this beta-binomial
model using data on the 75,300 on-site elections with between 2 and 200 eligible voters, at
least 2 votes cast, and no challenged ballots. The estimated year eects (^ 0+ ^ t) are plotted
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Figure 13: Beta Density Function of Pro-Union Share (Based on  = 0:59,  = 3:10,
corresponding to an election with 20 eligible voters and 0 + t = 0:5.
This mirrors the trend in the pro-union vote share in the raw data illustrated in gure 2
The estimate of 1 is 0.398 (s.e. = 0.008), implying that the fraction pro-union is, as
expected, inversely related to election size. If the year eect in a given year is 0.5, then the
model predicts an expected fraction pro-union of 0.7 in elections with 4 eligible voters. This
falls substantially to 0.54 in elections with 100 eligible voters. The estimate of  is 3.07 (s.e.
= 0.024), implying substantial heterogeneity across elections of a given size in the fraction
pro-union. The implied standard deviation of  is
q
(1 )
+1 . Evaluated at  = 0:59 (the
predicted value of  in an election with 20 eligible voters and 0 + t = 0:5), the standard
deviation of  is 0.244. As an illustration, gure 13 contains a plot of the estimated density
function for  assuming  = 0:59 and  = 3:07, as estimated. Clearly, there is substantial
variation across elections in pro-union sentiment.
With these estimates in hand, I predict the expected value of  conditional on the ob-
served pro-union vote share in each election in my sample based on equation 29. I then use
this to calculated my inverse metric of the expected closeness of each election, the expected

















































Figure 14: Turnout Rate, by Square Root of Expected Squared Deviation of Union Share
from 0.5 (Equation 30).
value of the squared deviation of  from 0.5 conditional on the observed pro-union vote
share, as dened in equation 30.
Figure 14 contains a bar graph of the average turnout rate (weighted by the number
eligible) for various levels of the square root of the expected squared deviation of the pro-
union vote share from 0.5. There is clear evidence that the turnout rate drops o substantially
as this deviation exceeds 0.2. This is consistent with a worker's vote/no-vote decision being
positively related to the probability of being pivotal, reecting a higher probability of being
pivotal in close elections.
The rst column of table 2 contains estimates of the beta-binomial model of election
turnout that includes the measure of election closeness (E(( 0:5)2js)) as well as the inverse
square root of the number of eligible voters. The results show the strong inverse relationship
between turnout and election size. They also show a strong positive relationship between
turnout and expected election closeness. This is consistent with at least some workers making
33Table 2: Beta-Binomial Model Model of Voter Turnout
Variable













Year FE's Yes Yes
 7.100 7.167
(0.0682) (0.0690)
Log L -125580.8 -125383.2
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood over the sample of 75,300 on-site elections (with a
total of 2,014,616 eligible voters) with no challenged ballots, between 2 and 200 eligible voters and
at least 2 votes cast. The base year is 2000. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
decisions regarding turnout based on perceptions of the likelihood of being pivotal.
In order to illustrate how the distribution of the turnout rate is aected by closeness,
gure 15 contains plots of the cumulative distribution functions of the beta distributions of
of the vote probability for three dierent values of
p
E((   0:5)2js) based on the estimates
in the rst column of table 2. The plots clearly show that where the election is expected to
be close (DEV =
p
E((   0:5)2js) = 0), the turnout distribution is lies to the right of the
case where the election is expected to be not at all close (DEV =
p
E((   0:5)2js) = 0:5).
5.4 Turnout and the Interaction of Election Size and Election
Closeness
The usual statistical properties imply that there is more variation around the mean in small
samples than in large samples. In the context of the likelihood of being pivotal, this implies
that, for a given expected pro-union vote share, the likelihood that a voter will be pivotal falls
with election size. On this basis, I expect that the marginal eect on turnout of the deviation
of the expected pro-union vote share from 0.5 will fall in absolute value with election size.















































Figure 15: Cumulative Distribution Function of Vote Probability.
The parameters of the Beta distribution are based on the estimates in column 1 of table 2
for m = (0:9   0:3257  E((   0:5)2js) and  = 7:100. DEV =
p
E((   0:5)2js)
including an additional term in the expected turnout that is the interaction of the inverse
number of eligible voters and E((   0:5)2js). These estimates are contained in the second
column of table 2, and they yield the opposite result. It appears that the marginal eect
of closeness increases in absolute value (becomes more negative) as the number of eligible
voters increases. This is not consistent with voters deciding on the margin to vote based on
their probability of being pivotal.
Once again, while I do not present the results here, I have also estimated both of the
models in table 2 including additional controls for NLRB region, occupation, and industry.
As before, adding these controls has no substantive eect on the coecients of interest, and
the estimate of  increases somewhat (to about 8.0), reecting the fact that that there is
less unobserved heterogeneity across election sites once variation in region, industry, and
occupation are accounted for directly.
356 Implications of the Model
The estimates of the beta-binomial model of turnout support the idea that consideration of
the likelihood of being pivotal does aect the vote decision on the margin for at least some
voters. The is based on the ndings that 1) probability of voting is negatively related to
the size of the election and 2) the probability of voting is positively related to the expected
closeness of the vote. However, questions remain:
1. How important are the rational choice factors? Clearly (see gure 15), most elections
have very high turnout, suggesting that most of those eligible vote regardless of the
likelihood of being pivotal. I put some structure on this issue below using the estimates
of the beta-binomial model.
2. Can the rational choice model account for the observed decline in turnout over time?
To the extent the factors in the model related to the probability of being pivotal can
account for the decline in voter turnout, the importance of rational choice analysis of
the vote decision is reinforced. I examine this directly using the estimates of the model.
3. Is social pressure an important motivating factor in the vote decision? Social pressure
is an alternative interpretation of the inverse relationship between turnout and election
size. I examine this by estimating the relationship between turnout and election size
in mail elections (where social pressure is likely much smaller).
6.1 A Structural Interpretation: How Many Voters Consider the
Likelihood of Being Pivotal?
An interesting interpretation of the results presented here is based on the idea that there are
two kinds of voters:
 Type I workers who vote regardless of the likelihood of being pivotal, and
 Type II workers who consider the likelihood of being pivotal in deciding whether or
not to vote.
In the context of the model developed in section 3.2, Type I workers are those whose costs of
voting, broadly dened, are zero or negative. Type II workers are those with positive voting
36costs. How many of each type exist in a given election is determined by the distribution of
costs (G()). Variation in this cost distribution is likely an important part of heterogeneity
across elections in turnout.
One way to quantify the relative frequencies of the two types of voters is to consider
the case where the probability of being pivotal is vanishingly small so that the observed
distribution of turnout is the distribution of the share of Type I workers. The probability of
being pivotal vanishes as the size of the election gets very large (N ! 1) and the election
is not close (approximated by E((   0:5)2js) = 0:25). Substituting these values into the
formula for the mean of the beta binomial using the estimates in the rst column of table 2
and assuming the year 2000 xed eect estimate (= 0:008), yields a predicted value for the
mean of 0.791.29 This suggests that, on average, about 80 percent of workers vote regardless
of the likelihood of being pivotal and the remaining 20 percent, on average, consider whether
or not their vote will be pivotal in deciding whether to vote. Given the average turnout rate
in 2000 of about 0.9, this implies that, on average, about half of those voters who consider
the likely instrumentality of their vote do, in fact, vote.
By these calculations, there is considerable heterogeneity across elections in the share
of voters who are Type I. Figure 16 contains a plot of the cumulative distribution function
of the Type I share across elections calculated as the distribution of turnout in an election
that is not close (E((   0:5)2js) = 0:25) with an innite number of voters. The median of
this distribution is 0.81, suggesting that half of all elections have at least 81 percent Type I
workers. Additionally, almost 25 percent of elections have at least 90 percent Type I workers.
The conclusion is that most of those eligible vote without consideration of the likelihood
that their vote will be pivotal. However, there is a substantial fraction, varying across
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Figure 16: Cumulative Distribution Function of Share of Type I Voters.
The parameters of the Beta distribution are based on the estimates in column 1 of table 2
for m = 0:791 and  = 7:1, corresponding to an election in scal year 2000 that is not close
with a very large number of eligible voters.
6.2 Can the Rational Choice Model Account for the Decline in
Turnout?
As demonstrated in gure 4, average turnout in on-site elections fell from 92 percent to
84 percent between 1972 and 2008. I use the estimates of the year xed eects from the
beta-binomial model in column 1 of table 2 to examine the extent to which the turnout
model can account for this decline. As a benchmark, I calculated the year xed eects of
a similar beta-binomial model that includes only the year xed eects. This benchmark
model includes neither the measure of the size of the election nor the measure of expected
closeness. The results of this exercise are presented in gure 17. The plot of \year eects
29 Using the estimates in the second column of table 2 yields a smaller estimate for the share of Type
I workers of 0.729. I am less comfortable with this estimate given the fact that there are not many very
large elections and the estimated main eect on E((   0:5)2js) is strongly aected by the presence of the
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Figure 17: Adjusted and Unadjusted Mean Turnout Rates, on-site elections by year.
w/o controls" presents simply the year xed eects from the benchmark model, and these
approximate average turnout. The plot of \year eects w/controls" are the year eects from
the model in the rst column of table 2 shifted to match the benchmark value in the rst
year (1972).
There is clearly scope for the factors in the model related to the likelihood of being
pivotal to account for at least some of the decline in turnout. Elections both increased in
size and were expected to be less close over this period. The average number of eligible voters
increased from 24 to 30 between 1972 and 2008. The average expected squared deviation of
the pro-union vote share from 0.5, the inverse measure of expected closeness, increased from
0.065 to 0.093 over the same period.
The results suggest that the rational choice model accounts for about 30 percent of the
decline in average turnout. For example, the 2008 benchmark value of 0.857 represents a
decline of 0.049 from the 1972 benchmark value. In contrast, the plotted 2008 year eect
from the economic model is 0.872, implying an unexplained decline of 0.034. Thus, 0.015 (31
























1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Fiscal Year













Figure 18: Turnout Rate, by Mode of Election { 3 yr. Moving Average for Mail Elections
for by the economic model.
6.3 Social Pressure or Instrumentality: On-Site vs. Mail Elections
As I discussed earlier, an important alternative to the model of voting based on consideration
of the likelihood that a voter will be pivotal is the model based on social pressure. These
two models have dierent predictions for the relationship between election size and turnout.
While both models predict that the turnout will decline with election size in on-site elections,
only the model based on instrumentality of the vote extends this prediction to mail elections
(where social pressure will be largely absent).
The empirical analysis of mail elections is hampered by the fact that there are relatively
few such elections. In the analysis sample used to estimate the beta-binomial model, there
were 75,300 elections. There are only 1,845 mail elections that meet the same criteria.
The most obvious dierence between mail and on-site elections is that turnout is much
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Figure 19: Pro-Union Vote Share, by Mode of Election { 3 yr. Moving Average for Mail
Elections
and mail elections.30 While there is some drop-o in the average turnout rate in on-site
elections, the turnout rate in on-site elections is substantially higher throughout than the
turnout rate in mail elections. The turnout rate of elections with mail ballots declined
sharply from about 85 percent in 1998 to about 60 percent in 2008. In contrast, over the
same period, turnout rates in on-site elections fell from about 90 percent to about 84 percent.
Examining elections closed in scal 1984 or later, there is not a signicant dierence in
the number eligible between on-site and mail elections. However, mail elections tended to be
less close in outcome than on-site elections. Figure 19 contains plots of the average pro-union
vote share over time by mode of election. The average pro-union vote share is greater in
mail elections than in on-site elections, and it grows much more rapidly in mail elections
after the late 1990s.
30 Due to the small number of mail elections in any year, I plot the 3-year moving average of the turnout
rate for mail elections.
41Table 3: Beta-Binomial Model Model of Voter Turnout
Variable
On-Site Mail







E((   0:5)2js) -0.3257 -0.2338
(0.0087) (0.0670)
Year FE's Yes Yes
 7.100 3.660
(0.0682) (0.1601)
Log L -125580.8 -4484.9
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood over the samples of 75,300 on-site elections
(with a total of 2,014,616 eligible voters) and 1845 mail elections (with a total of 52,820
eligible voters) with no challenged ballots, between 2 and 200 eligible voters and at least 2
votes cast. The base year is 2000. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
The data on pro-union vote shares in gure 19 suggests that there is scope for the
economic model to account for the dierence in turnout between mail and on-site elections.
I already showed (gure 17) that changes in the factors aecting the likelihood of being
pivotal, election size and expected closeness, can account for about 30 percent of the decline in
turnout in on-site elections. Figure 19 suggests that, on average, mail elections are expected
to be less close than on-site elections and that mail elections have become even less close over
time. This could account for at least some of the sharp decline in turnout in mail elections
shown in gure 18.
Table 3 contains estimates of the beta-binomial model of turnout separately for on-site
and mail elections. Column 1 contains estimates for on-site elections (identical to column 1 of
table 2) and column 2 contains estimates for mail elections. Comparison of the estimates for
the two groups of elections provides a test of whether social pressure, potentially important
in on-site elections but less important in mail elections, can account for the relationship
between turnout and election size.
To the extent that social pressure is an important factor in the relationship between
turnout and election size, we would expect to nd a smaller coecient on the size measure
42in determining mean turnout in mail elections than in on-site elections. The results are
the opposite. The estimated coecient on the size measure is signicantly larger in mail
elections (p-value of dierence = 0.032). This suggests that social pressure to vote is not an
important factor in the turnout decision.
It is important to note that this test does not rule out the importance of a norm that
encourages voting. Indeed, it may be the case that such a norm accounts for the high general
turnout rates in these elections. The nding that most voters vote without regard to the
likelihood that their vote would be pivotal (\type I" voters) is consistent with the existence
of this norm. The test simply is evidence against the idea that observability of the act of
voting is an important factor.
The point estimate of the marginal eect of the inverse measure of closeness (E((  
0:5)2js)) is signicantly negative, as expected, in mail elections. This estimate for mail
elections is smaller in magnitude than the corresponding estimate for on-site elections, though
the dierence is not statistically signicant (p-value = 0.174).
I noted above that the growing gap between the pro-union vote share and 0.5 in mail
elections could account for at least part of the sharp decline in turnout in mail elections.
In order to investigate this directly in a manner parallel to the analysis for on-site elections
in gure 17, I use the estimates of the year xed eects from the beta-binomial model for
mail elections in column 2 of table 3 to examine the extent to which the turnout model can
account for this decline. As a benchmark, I calculated the year xed eects of a similar
model for mail elections that includes only the year xed eects. The results of this exercise
are presented in gure 20. The plot of \year eect w/o controls" approximates average
turnout, and the plot of \year eect w/controls" based on the estimates in the rst column
of table 3 shifted to match the benchmark value in the rst year (1984). The results suggest
that, despite decreasing closeness of the mail elections over time and the implied reduction
in turnout, the economic factors appear to explain little of the decline in turnout in mail
elections.
A nal exercise is to examine the extent to which the economic factors in the model can
account for the dierence between mail and on-site elections. To this end, gure 21 contains
plots of the dierence in estimated year eects between mail and on-site elections for two
specications. The rst does not include controls for election size or expected closeness
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Difference in Year Effects, Mail - On-site
 Dierence w/o controls: The dierence in the estimated year eects in the model without controls for
election size or closeness between mail and on-site elections.
 Dierence w/controls: The dierence in the estimated year eects in the model with controls for
election size or closeness between mail and on-site elections.
Figure 21: Dierence in Year Eects between Mail and On-Site Elections, by presence of
economic controls and year.
44elections. The second includes these controls. The results clearly indicate that the variables
measuring size and closeness, do not account for any of the dierence in turnout between
mail and on-site elections.
In the end, the mail elections, which constitute only a small fraction of all elections,
appear to have substantially lower turnout than on-site elections for reasons that are not
related to the likelihood that a voter will be pivotal. It may be that mail elections are costlier
(in terms of time, eort, memory, etc.) than are on-site elections held in the workplace.
However, this would not explain the sharp decline over time in turnout in mail elections.
However, it does appear to be the case that, within mail elections, turnout is strongly
negatively related to both election size and expected closeness.
I conclude that social pressure is not an important factor in explaining the inverse rela-
tionship found in on-site elections between election size and turnout.
7 Final Comments
It is clear from the analysis that most workers vote without consideration of the likelihood
that they will be pivotal. But it is also clear that at least some workers, albeit a minority in
most cases, understand in general terms how likely it is that they will be pivotal in deciding
whether or not to vote. This is reected both in lower turnout rates in larger elections and in
higher turnout rates in elections where preferences are relatively evenly split. However, the
results suggest that workers do not take into account the precise calculus dened in section
3.2 when deciding whether or not to vote. They do not appear to consider the second-
order interaction between election size and closeness. Neither do they appear to consider
the specic rules that lead to the asymmetry between even and odd elections. This might
reect a lack of understanding of the election rules regarding ties or a lack of information
about whether the number eligible is odd or even.
It is worth considering whether there are alternative interpretations for the support that
is found for the rational choice model of voting. One possibility that I explored is that social
pressure in the workplace, where the workplace is also the election site, might be important
in getting people to vote. The reasonable assumption that social pressure is likely stronger
in smaller elections than larger elections, one would expect to nd a weaker relationship
between turnout and election size in mail elections. However, I nd the opposite. This
45implies that direct social pressure, enforced through observability of the act of voting, is not
an important factor.
An alternative view of social pressure is that it is simply is the mechanism through with
workers are made aware that an election will be close or that their vote is more likely to
matter. In this case, social pressure is part of a rational choice decision process. More
generally, there may be variation in social pressure or a general norm to vote that is an
important driver of the heterogeneity in turnout rates (or Type I share) across elections.
The factors in my model related to the likelihood that a vote will be pivotal can account
for about 30 percent of the decline in voter turnout in on-site NLRB representation elections
in recent years. It is not clear what accounts for the remainder of the decline.
There are limits to how far the lessons learned by studying turnout in NLRB represen-
tation elections can be generalized to larger political elections. This is for several reasons.
First, even relatively small local elections are much larger than most elections studied here.
Second, the physical cost of voting in political elections is higher since the elections are
generally held at a location to which the voter must travel while the NLRB representation
elections are held in the work place. Finally, the stakes in a political election for an individ-
ual are generally lower than in an election which can fundamentally alter the employment
situation. All of these factors likely contribute to the higher turnout observed in NLRB
representation elections.
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